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Option Informativeness Before Earnings Announcements and 




Purpose. This article investigates whether single-name options trading prior to earnings 
announcements is more informative when there exist real activity manipulations. 
Design/methodology/approach. Using 5,419 earnings announcements during 2004-2018 
made by 208 public U.S. companies with relatively high options volumes ranked by the 
CBOE, we uncover two regularities using predictive regressions for stock return. 
Findings. First, the total options volume up to twenty days pre-announcement is 
significantly higher than that in other periods only for earnings management firms; 
moreover, after detailing options characteristics, we find these intensive pre-
announcement trading to be concentrated in transactions of in-the-money call and long-
term maturity put options. Second, an increase in the single-name call minus put options 
volume can positively predict the underlying stock’s next-day excess return much better 
in real earnings management firms, with a larger magnitude of effect in periods right 
before regular earnings announcement dates. 
Originality/value. This paper makes a marginal and novel contribution by showing that 
real earnings management can serve as a proxy for the potential profit from informed 
trading in options as the return predictability of options volume becomes stronger for 
firms that have the manipulation motive and indeed perform manipulative actions. 
 
 
JEL Classification: G12, G13, G14, M41 
 
Keywords: Options trading volume, near-term return predictability, earnings 
announcement, real earnings management 
  
1. Introduction 
There is a consensus in the literature that, in the presence of information frictions, the 
options market serves as a crucial venue to accommodate informed investors. Such 
investors seek to capitalize on their privately-held information there, hence facilitating 
price discovery across all markets (Black, 1975; Copeland, 1976; Easley et al., 1998)1. 
This consensus has laid down a solid theoretical foundation for the return predictability of 
options trading volumes, especially before the release of important corporate-specific 
news, in the empirical world (Amin and Lee, 1997; Cao et al., 2005). More recent studies 
have put more emphasis on trading microstructure, cross-market interaction, and 
modeling techniques to extract from options the exact and valuable messages related to 
the underlying stocks. However, studies about how the underlying firm characteristics 
affect the predictor power of options volume over future stock returns are sparse. This 
paper hence investigates whether single-name options trading prior to earnings 
announcements (EA) is more informative for firms that are suspected of conducting real 
earnings management activities (REM). The logic behind the investigation is that real 
activity manipulation should contain more private information and imply higher profit 
potential in options markets. 
 
The importance of our approach is twofold. For one, arguably one of the most material 
items in financial reports, EAs provide a vast amount of data about a firm’s fundamentals 
on a regular basis. Given earnings are commonly subject to manager strategically 
managing earnings in response to shocks (Cohen et al., 2008; Farrell et al., 2014), it is 
crucial for both academics and practitioners to fully understand whether an increased 
options trading before EAs is dominated by leakages of knowledge about true earnings or 
by speculative bets on historical trends of stock prices. For another, while a large body of 
literature is exploring the relations between stock trading activities, real earnings 
management, and stock performance (Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Gallant et al., 1992; 
Hiemstra and Jones, 1994; Lo and Wang, 2000; Li, 2010; Peng et al., 2016), the 
 
1 Black (1975), among others, emphasizes that informed traders are attracted to the options market by the 
market’s high leverage achievable, and also by the downside risk protection provided by derivatives. 
association between transactions in the options market and returns from the underlying 
stock for firms that have conducted real activities manipulations has not yet be been 
studied. 
 
Following previous research (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al.,2008; Zang, 2012; 
Farrell et al., 2014), we estimate two REM estimates: the abnormal levels of production 
costs as our main variable and the abnormal levels of discretionary expenses as a 
robustness check. This paper demonstrates that the interaction between a REM dummy 
(equals to 1 if the firms just meet analysts forecast and there indeed exist abnormal 
expenditures; 0 otherwise) and an option informative proxy (the daily total call volume 
minus put volume) foreshadows next-day excess stock return up to twenty days prior to 
EAs. Moreover, we also find that this predictive power stays robust to regressing in 
various subsamples classified according to options characteristics. In particular, we 
uncover the following two key empirical regularities. 
 
First, we discover that during the pre-announcement period, which is defined as twenty 
days before EAs, the average daily options volume of in-the-money calls for REM firms 
is significantly higher (143.8% for short-term maturity contracts, and 94.6% for long-term 
maturity contracts) than that for their counterparties in the benchmark period, which is 
defined as from twenty days after the previous EA date to twenty-one days before the 
latest EA date. Long-term puts for all moneyness categories also have significantly higher 
trading volume for REM firms during Pre-EA periods. Turning to non-REM firms, no 
such significance is found except for out-of-the-money calls (a 43.7% and 25.4% increase 
during pre-EA periods for short-term and long-term maturity, respectively). This 
regularity provides a crude indication that the options market is more informative before 
EAs and under real activities manipulation. However, since uninformed traders also like 
to bet firms with private information around prescheduled events, it is a challenging task 
to identify the extent to which the pre-EA volume for REM firms increase is based on 
information rather than speculation. We argue this should not be a concern by presenting 
our next regularity. 
 
Second, we find that the pre-announcement can minus put volume can indeed predict the 
next-day contemporaneous excess returns of the underlying stocks, especially for firms 
suspected of managing earnings by discretionary expenditure manipulation. It is further 
shown that this predictability stays robust to options characteristics (e.g. moneyness and 
expiry date). In specific, by categorizing all sample options into moneyness- and 
maturity-based buckets, we find that options categories with the higher volume 
concentration and larger percentage rise normally display stronger predictive abilities 
irrespective of REM characteristics. But considering only REM firms our option 
informativeness proxy exhibits persistent predictability for all moneyness-maturity 
subsamples. This conclusion is consistent with that arrived at by Degeorge et al. (1999), 
in which firms who are under suspicion of boosting their earnings over specified 
behavioral thresholds have incentives to report a lower future performance. To the best of 
our knowledge, our article is among the first to demonstrate a meaningful connection 
between earnings manipulation and the information contained in options volume. In 
addition, it also justifies our previous finding, which suggests that the equity options 
market serves as an important venue of informed trading activities before prescheduled 
corporate events, not just before unexpected events such as mergers and acquisitions. 
 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. In 
Section 3 we develop testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes data and identification 
methods. Section 5 discusses empirical results, followed by a Section 6 that concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Our article is related to two literature strands that attempt to discern the codes conveyed 
by options trading behaviors. One strand lays the theoretical foundations for our 
hypotheses proposed in the next section. Another strand empirically tests the options 
market’s information content. We make a marginal contribution by studying whether the 
return predictability of pre-EA options trading volume is more prominent for underlying 
firms that have manipulated their earnings in a real way. 
 
Regarding the theoretical literature, despite the noise-trader argument (e.g., De Long et al., 
1990; Choy and Wei, 2012;), it is generally agreed upon that just being listed in the 
options market facilitates information processing in stock markets. Ho (1993) documents 
a higher degree of institutional holdings and wider coverage of news as two possible 
channels for enhanced price discovery of stocks with listed options. Kumar et al. (1998) 
document a decrease in bid-ask spreads but an increase in stock turnovers after 
corresponding option listings. Besides the binary variable of option listing, the options 
trading volume is considered to be a better proxy for information arrival rates (Amin and 
Lee, 1997; Easley et al., 1998; Cao et al., 2005; Pan and Poteshman, 2006) because 
options reveal equity prices actively (or limitedly) when their trading volume is thick (or 
thin) as argued by Roll et al. (2010). 
 
The informativeness of the options market is also reflected in the evidence that stocks 
with listed options will adjust price faster upon EAs (Jennings and Starks, 1986). 
However, from this point on, the literature diverges in terms of the magnitude of this 
adjustment. Some find a smaller magnitude with stocks having listed options since 
information about earnings to be released has already been partially impounded in stock 
prices before the announcement day (Skinner, 1990; Atiase and Bamber, 1994; Ho, 1993; 
Ho et al. 1995). Others argue the opposite because they believe the response of stock 
prices upon EAs is a gradual process, not a jump. So, higher volumes of pre-EA options 
trading may help correct the initial under-reaction, and the options market will thus 
facilitate a more complete, larger magnitude of price adjustments (Mendenhall and Fehrs, 
1999; Turong and Corrado, 2014). In the latter case, the options volume represents 
investors’ attention (Lo and Wang, 2000; Chordia and Swaminathan, 2000; Barber and 
Odean, 2008). Our results support the former argument indirectly---a significant 
predictive power of options volume implies that rational informed actions overwhelm 
irrational investor attentions. 
 
Our article is mostly complementary to the discussions on how single-name options 
trading activities can predict future underlying stock returns before the release of firm-
specific information. Philbrick and Stephan (1993) and Amin and Lee (1997) discover a 
larger reaction of options trading volume to earnings announcements than stock, with 
more long positions initiated ahead of positive earnings news. These are clear evidence 
that the options market contains information for stock prices, but whether such 
information can foreshadow future stock returns is dependent on a range of factors. First 
of all, the type of information plays a role here. Cao et al. (2005) show that higher pre-
takeover-announcement volume on call options is predictive of higher future stock prices, 
but higher pre-EA option volume is not so good as the corresponding stock volume. The 
second factor is market conditions or structure. Studies that follow Hasbrouk (1995) in 
computing the information share in option quotes generally suggest no price discovery 
function for the options market, unless when the stock price hits the option strike price 
(Chakravarty et al., 2004) or if counterfactually option quotes make no adjustments for 
eliminating arbitrage (Muravyev et al., 2013). Therefore, their findings imply that the 
stock and options market interact to generate return predictability. Other studies resort to 
higher moments of option variables as return predictors preceding EAs (Patell and 
Wolfson, 1981; Bollen and Whaley, 2004; Dubinsky and Johannes, 2006; Ni et al., 2008; 
Diavatopoulos et al., 2012; Chung and Louis, 2017; Gao et al., 2018). The drawback of 
the higher-moment indicators is that they are weak concerning economic intuitions. 
 
The importance of market microstructure leads to the third factor of cross-market linkages. 
Easley et al. (1998) document that directional option volume contains information for 
contemporaneous stock prices, but there exists less decisive evidence that it leads future 
stock prices. A group of scholars utilizes volume ratios to capture the interaction. For 
example, Pan and Poteshman (2006) and Kang et al. (2018) deem put-call volume ratios 
as good return predictors. Roll et al. (2010), Johnson and So (2012), and Ge et al. (2016) 
all trust option-to-stock trading volume ratios in prediction. However, after controlling for 
stock order flow, Chan et al. (2002) conclude unambiguously that options order flow does 
not possess pricing power compared to stocks. To unbundle the entangled effects, Hu 
(2014) decomposes the total stock order imbalance into an option-induced imbalance and 
an imbalance independent of options. He then shows that, in the presence of the past 
stock and options returns, the option-induced imbalance significantly predicts future stock 
returns, but the imbalance independent of options has only a transitory price impact. 
Fourth, firm characteristics matter. Lee and Yi (2001) argue that options with greater 
financial leverage for the underlying firm are more attractive to informed investors. Based 
on transaction data on the German DAX index, Schlag and Stoll (2005) find that options 
volume fails to predict stock index changes. Their finding implies that the predictability 
of individual options from different firms is canceling out each other at the index level. 
Our article contributes to the literature about the fourth factor by emphasizing the role of 
REM activities as an important firm characteristic in affecting the return predictability of 
option volumes. 
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
In the options market, the level of trade volume for a single-name option immediately 
prior to EAs is significantly higher than the corresponding level in non-EA periods. Given 
this, the extant literature has shown that the information content or return predictability of 
options trading is prominent during earnings preannouncements, and even more 
prominent when the actual announced figures (i.e., high earnings surprise) or analyst 
dispersion (i.e., large standard deviation of the analysts’ EPS forecasts) suggest a high-
profit potential for informed options trading. While the earnings surprise and analyst 
dispersion proxy are event characteristics, one frequently-used proxy for profit potential 
high options trading profit is analyst coverage, which can be considered as a firm 
characteristic capturing the level of information asymmetry. In this paper, we hypothesize 
real earnings management activities to be another firm-specific information asymmetry 
measure. If we are correct, we should observe a stronger return predictive power of 
options volume for REM firms during the pre-EA periods. 
 
To carry out formal empirical analyses to test this hypothesis, we first divide all 
companies into two groups: those suspected of earnings management and those 
unsuspected. According to Graham et al. (2005), the suspected ones are defined as firms 
whose disclosed EPS is 0-to-1-cent lower than the latest analyst forecast consensus before 
fiscal year-end for at least one year over our sample period. Then, we further divide the 
suspected group members into REM firms and non-REM firms. REM firms are those who 
have abnormal levels of discretionary expenses. Next, the options volume predictor is 
constructed by subtracting the daily put trading volume from the corresponding call 
trading volume. Finally, we interact the REM firm dummy with the call minus put volume 
and then regress daily returns above the risk-free rate on this interaction. A significant 
coefficient estimate would suggest the holding of our hypothesis. By completing the 
above procedures, we make a marginal and novel contribution: REM can serve as a proxy 
for the potential profit from informed trading in options. Or put it another way, the return 
predictability of options order imbalance becomes stronger for firms that have the 
motivation to manipulate their earnings and indeed perform REM actions. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data Sources 
The daily options market data is obtained from the OptionMetrics database, which is 
devoted to research areas such as analyzing market movement before corporate events 
and exploring serial relation between options variables and stock returns. As these 
historical options data fit the scope of our study, we combine them with other standard 
sources of data including CRSP, IBES, and COMPUSTAT. Hence, our raw sample 
includes all public firms listed in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with options on their 
stocks traded in a range of exchanges, e.g., the CBOE, ISE, AMEX, PHLX, NYSE Arca, 
and BOX. Note that firms with missing values on major financial statement variables and 
firms classified into finance and utilities industries are excluded due to good reasons. 
 
We choose a long fifteen-year sample period spanning from January 2004 to December 
2018, since there exists great randomness in options speculators in various economic 
cycles and at different stages of a business cycle (i.e., our sample period covers the 2002 
dotcom bubble burst, the 2007 credit crisis onset, the 2012 European sovereign debt crisis 
and the 2016-2018 worldwide stock market downturns). The sample period starts right 
after top corporate executives were prohibited from wrongly exercising warrants (i.e., our 
sample period can just fully reflect the short-, medium- and long-run economic 
consequences of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act), and winds up to the most recent data 
available year. Due to issues of effects canceling out over a long period, we also construct 
three cross-sectional subsamples, 2004-2005, 2011, and 2017-2018, representing the 
onset, middle, and end of our original sample. 
 
We repeat all exercises in these subsamples and find robust results, but earlier results are 
relatively more significant than later ones. Our conjecture for the reason behind this is 
that, with reforms post the 2007 credit crisis aiming at building more strictly regulated 
derivatives markets, informed investors confront more scrutiny and become less willing 
to trade in the options market.2 As a result, the informative trades are less active. 
Furthermore, these subsamples can avoid extreme influences exerted by crisis periods as 
frequent earnings manipulations in turbulent months will defunct the price discovery 
function of pre-EA options trading volume. Nevertheless, it turns out that our findings 
based on the entire sample period are unchanged in selected sub-periods. 
 
As for sample firms, given that both investors and speculators prefer liquid contracts (this 
is because better-informed investors stop exploiting their information due to illiquidity 
and ill-informed speculators profit from buying low and selling high as fast as possible), 
we restrict our dataset to publicly-listed U.S. companies that have at least appeared once 
in the top 100 traded equity options according to the CBOE at each of the fifteen sample 
years. By applying this rule to the raw sample, our base sample consists of 208 companies 
 
2 According to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 2008 Year in Review and Annual 
Financial Report, by executing a more rigorous examination system and rulebook enforcement, FINRA has 
issued 200 formal complaints and 1,007 decisions in formal disciplinary cases against regulation violators 
in equity trading places including the equity options markets. 
with 5,419 EAs. Although the rank is by CBOE, the daily trading volume for each firm’s 
options is computed as the average volume transacted across all options exchanges. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
To begin with, we compute call minus put volume as the daily difference between the 
total put volume generated by the optionable stock under concern and the total call 
volume. In light of the interaction between the options and the stock market, we also need 
to control for abnormal stock transactions. Let us denote the current earnings 
announcement date and the previous earning announcement date for the firm of interest 
by EA_DATEt and EA_DATEt-τ, respectively. We then define the pre-announcement 
period as one to twenty days before an announcement date and the benchmark period as 
the twenty days after the previous EA date to twenty-one days before the current EA date. 
The daily abnormal option trading volume is calculated by first subtracting the mean 
trading volume over the benchmark period from the daily trading volume, and then 
dividing this difference by the mean trading volume. 
 
Next, we continue to construct REM measures in two steps. As for step 1, we identified 
suspected REM firms based on a strategy that exploits the pressure faced by public 
companies in meeting analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Degeorge et al., 1999; Cohen et al., 2008). 
In particular, a suspected firm is defined as one whose actual EPS, evaluated before the 
fiscal-year-end, turns out to be lower than the last consensus of analyst forecasts by a 
wedge between 0 and 1 cent. The reason why this treatment is necessary goes as follows. 
If we directly inspect REM activity indicators in the full sample, then for firms with no 
motive to manipulate earnings, a large indicator value might just imply more economic 
activities other than conducting REM. Since beating earnings is addictive, as long as a 
firm’s EPS was 0-to-1 cent below forecast in at least one year during our entire sample 
period, we will label it as suspected. By doing this, we form the largest possible treatment 
group of suspected firms. 
 
As for step 2, we estimate a primary proxy, the abnormal part of production costs, for real 
manipulative activities. The normal production cost can be expressed as a function of 
contemporaneous sales in absolute terms as well as both the contemporaneous change and 
















+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑦 , 
 
where the production cost is defined as the sum of costs of goods sold and changes in 
inventories. All the variables are scaled by total assets at the end of the year y-1 and 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Then, the abnormal production cost is computed 
as the gap between the actual cost incurred and the firm’s normal level derived by 
estimated coefficients from the above equation. We also estimate an alternative proxy, 
abnormal levels of discretionary expenses, as a robustness check. 
 
Similarly to production cost, the normal level of discretionary expense is estimated as a 











+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑦 , 
 
where the discretionary expense is defined as the sum of advertising expenses, R&D, and 
SG&A expenses. We scale all regression variables by total assets at the end of year y-1 
and winsorize them at the 1st and 99th percentile. The abnormal part of the discretionary 
expense is, therefore, measured by the difference between the target firm’s actual expense 
and its normal level predicted by the above estimating equation. Now, it is ready to define 
a dummy of REM that equals 1 for firms using abnormal levels of production costs or 
discretionary expenses to manipulate earnings; and 0 otherwise. 
 
At last, to investigate the information content of options volume, we test among REM 
firms the options volume’s implications on the underlying stock’s price movements in the 
near future. The empirical equation is specified as follows: 
 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑦
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑦 × 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜸𝑭 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 . 
 
On the left-hand side, let ri,t be the CRSP return of firm i in excess of the risk-free rate 
(taken from Kenneth R. French’s website) during trading day t. On the right-hand side, 
we use opti,t and opti,t-1 to denote, respectively, the contemporaneous and the lagged one-
day call minus put options volume of firm i in the trading day t and t-1. Similarly, we use 
stki,t and stki,t-1 to represent, respectively, the contemporaneous and the lagged one-day 
abnormal volume of the underlying stocks. REMi,y is a dummy equaling to 1 for firm i 
using abnormal levels of production costs to manipulate earnings at year t (the 
corresponding results using abnormal levels of discretionary expenses are very similar 
and thus not reported); and 0 otherwise. F represents the conventional Fama-French five 
factors as controls (Fama and French, 2015). Our expectation is that, if the options 
volume proxy is indeed informative before EAs and under REM, then the lagged 
abnormal options volume should have significant predictability for the next-day stock 
returns, after controlling for other contemporaneous volume effects such as the one that is 
originated from abnormal stock volumes. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Table 1 reports the cross-sectional averages of daily trading volumes for option contracts 
and their underlying stocks in both benchmark and pre-announcement periods and for 
both REM and non-REM firms. As can be seen, considering only REM firms, the average 
daily volume of transacted option contracts increases by 43 in absolute values and by 
7.65% in percentage terms, from 562 contracts in the benchmark period to 605 contracts 
in the pre-announcement period; the average daily volume of transacted option contracts 
for non-REM companies decrease by 5 and 0.71%, respectively, from 699 to 694. 
However, there is no significant difference between the rise in shares of underlying stocks 
transacted for the REM and non-REM firms. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, 
when comparing the trading activities during the benchmark periods to those during the 
pre-announcement periods, options will experience an increase in trading volume. What is 
new to previous findings, we find that this increase is mainly driven by firms with real 
activity manipulations. Therefore, even at first glance of the raw data, the findings in 
Table 1 support our hypothesis. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
We present in Table 2 changes of call and put volumes across subcategories of both 
moneyness and maturity characteristics, and observe significant differences when 
comparing the volume variables in benchmark and pre-EA periods for REM firms. 
Insignificance occurs mainly for non-REM underlying firms and REM firms over the 
short run with at-the-money and out-of-the-money option contracts. In specific, we 
observe three patterns by focusing on firms with detected real activity manipulation. First, 
short-term in-the-money call options with less than 2 months to expiry undergo 
significantly larger increases in terms of trading activities than their long-term 
counterparties. To get a sense of magnitude, the trading volumes of short- and long-term 
in-of-the-money call options rise by 143.8% and by 94.6%. Second, the percentage 
increases in short-term put options trading volume from benchmark to pre-EA periods, 
irrespective of moneyness, remain steady and significant over the range from 17.3% to 
38.3%. In contrast, non-REM firms may experience a decrease in options volume, 
suggesting less valuable private information to trade against before regular events. Since 
options are considered to be the riskiest hedging derivative, their high trading levels and 
volatilities prior to EAs for REM firms indicate that the spillovers of material and 
nonpublic information indeed emerge during the time of our interest. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
5.2 Forecasting Analysis 
This subsection runs predictive regressions of how stocks’ excess returns depend on call 
minus put volumes in two steps. We apply the empirical specification as described in 
subsection 4.2 to a panel dataset, in which inter-individual differences are used to reduce 
the collinearity between current and lag variables so that unrestricted time-adjustment 
patterns can be estimated (e.g., see Pakes and Griliches, 1984). This function of panel 
data can be attained in our paper since the Hausman test reveals a significant fixed effect. 
Conditional on option characteristics, Table 3 reports the results of regressing the next-
day excess stock returns on the interaction between the volume and REM variables during 
the benchmark and pre-announcement periods. By looking at these comparable results, 
we discover that the lagged call minus put options volume alone can significantly predict 
the next-day excess stock returns only for subcategories of long-term in-the-money and 
all-term out-of-the-money options. However, the magnitude of this predictive effect is 
much smaller when compared to the interaction term between the REM variable and the 
options volume variable. Although the interaction possesses predictive power for both the 
benchmark and pre-EA periods, the size of its estimated coefficients turns out to be 
slightly larger during the sample of pre-announcement periods.  At last, the results in 
Table 3 stay robust to changing the REM proxy based on the abnormal level of production 
costs to that of discretionary expenses. This result is evident for our proposed hypothesis 
that the return predictability of options volume becomes stronger for REM firms due to 
enhanced information asymmetry in such underlying issuers. It merits a note that our 
study suffers from the drawback of not incorporating trade direction and market 
microstructure (such as private vs. public information, options leverage, the concentration 
of informed traders, etc.) due to data limitation. We argue that our focus is on REM as a 
valid proxy of the amount of return information contained in options trading volume. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
6. Conclusion 
This article examines the information content of options volume prior to scheduled 
corporate events and under the constraint that the underlying firms highly likely have 
manipulated their earnings figures. We document a high degree of options trading 
activities before EAs for those REM firms, but not non-REM firms. Moreover, our daily 
call minus put volume in the options market contains private information on determinants 
of the underlying stock’s earnings, which is consistent with findings by Easley et al. 
(1998) that the options market is a venue for information-based trading. Our paper adds to 
the literature by showing the information is more useful when there exist real activity 
manipulation by the underlying companies. Hence, informed traders do trade options to 
capitalize on their private information prior to well-scheduled events, and their private 
information will be getting revealed through such options trading. Put it the other way 
around, options trading volume should be able to predict the underlying stock price 
movements. After pooling a panel dataset together, we indeed find that the above-
mentioned information revelation is mainly attained through short-term in-the-money call 
options and long-term put options, and the forecasting capability of options volumes 
becomes stronger for REM firms, implying behavioral aspects would affect the options 
volume’s informativeness. All these findings together suggest that the options market may 
be a venue for information-based trading even before prescheduled events and under 
earnings management by real manipulative activities. 
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Table 1: Average Trading Volume for Options and Underlying Stocks 
This table reports the cross-sectional averages of daily-adjusted trading volumes for options and their 
underlying stocks. Results are reported for (i) the benchmark period, which is defined as the period from the 
21st day after the previous EA date to 21 days before the current earnings announcement, [EA_DATEt-τ+21, 
EA_DATEt-21]; and (ii) the pre-announcement period, which is defined as the period of 20 trading days 
before the EA date, [EA_DATEt-20, EA_DATEt-τ]. REM firms are those both being the suspect of earnings 
manipulation and showing abnormal levels of production costs. We test the null hypothesis of no difference 
in means between the benchmark and pre-announcement period group by computing standard t-test 










Ave. No. of Call and Put Options Traded 
REM Firms 562 605 43 7.65% 
Non-REM Firms 699 694 -5 -0.71% 
Ave. Vol. of Underlying Stocks Traded (in 10,000 Shares) 
REM Firms 1,230 1,334 104 8.47% 
Non-REM Firms 1,453 1,540 86 5.94% 
No. of Daily Obs.     
REM Firms 10,093 3,343   
Non-REM Firms 27,948 9,119   
 
Table 2: Average Trading Volume for Call and Put Contracts across Moneyness-Maturity Categories 
For each moneyness-maturity category, this table presents the cross-sectional averages of options trading volumes for calls and puts in the benchmark and pre-announcement 
period. REM firms are those both being the suspect of earnings manipulation and showing abnormal levels of production costs. Options with maturities less (greater) than 60 
days are classified as short-term (long-term) options. Option moneyness is defined as follows: call options are in-the-money if the strike price is less than 90% of the 
underlying stock price; at the money if the strike price is greater than 90% of the stock price and less than 110% of the stock price; out-of-the-money if the strike price is 
greater than 110% of the underlying stock price. We test the null hypothesis of no difference in group means between the benchmark and pre-announcement period group by 












 Call Options Short Term (ST) With Maturity Less Than 60 Days  Long Term (LT) With Maturity Greater Than 60 Days 
REM Firms 
Out-of-the-Money 1,954 2,414 23.5%  2,401 2,787 16.1% 
At-the-Money 11,725 12,527 6.8%  2,860 3,047 6.5% 
In-the-Money 1,181 2,880 143.8%**  707 1,377 94.6%** 
Non-REM 
Firms 
Out-of-the-Money 2,341 3,363 43.7%**  2,816 3,532 25.4%** 
At-the-Money 23,874 23,766 -0.4%  4,633 5,096 10.0% 
In-the-Money 4,872 2,476 -49.2%  1,135 981 -13.6% 
 Put Options Short Term (ST) With Maturity Less Than 60 Days  Long Term (LT) With Maturity Greater Than 60 Days 
REM Firms 
Out-of-the-Money 2,133 2,623 23.0%  2,041 2,394 17.3%* 
At-the-Money 12,872 14,653 13.8%  2,293 2,965 29.3%*** 
In-the-Money 654 807 23.4%  356 492 38.3%*** 
Non-REM 
Firms 
Out-of-the-Money 2,337 2,020 -13.6%  1,784 1,825 2.3% 
At-the-Money 7,405 8,086 9.2%  1,782 1,910 7.2% 
In-the-Money 1,089 923 -15.2%  474 581 22.6% 
Table 3: Predicting Next-Day Excess Stock Returns by Call Minus Put Options Volume for REM Firms 
This table reports the regression results of the following specification: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑦 × 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜸𝑭 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , 
where ri,t is firm i stock return over day t in excess of risk-free rate, opti,t-1 and opti,t are, respectively, the lagged one-day and contemporaneous daily difference between the 
total call volume and the total put volume traded for underlying stock i, abnormal option volume, stki,t-1 and stki,t are, respectively, the lagged one-day and contemporaneous 
stock trading volumes. REMi,y is a dummy equaling to 1 for firm i using abnormal levels of production costs to manipulate earnings at year t (the corresponding results using 
abnormal levels of dicretionay expenses are very similar and thus not reported), and 0 otherwise. F represents the Fama-French five factors. All coefficient s are in unit of 10-5. 
T-values are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively. 
 Benchmark Period  Pre-Annoucement Period 
 At-the-Money In-the-Money Out-of-the-Money  At-the-Money In-the-Money Out-of-the-Money 
 ST LT ST LT ST SL  ST LT ST LT ST LT 
opti,t-1 
0.00 0.15* -0.02 -0.13*** 0.19*** 0.11***  -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.13*** 0.37*** 0.17*** 
(0.01) (1.71) (-0.70) (-2.98) (4.45) (2.70)  (-1.69) (-0.01) (-1.73) (-3.26) (4.04) (2.78) 
stki,t-1 
-0.06 -0.05 0.20 0.23 -0.14 -0.17  0.11 0.18 1.21 1.16 -0.07 -0.08 
(-0.05) (-0.05) (0.19) (0.23) (-0.14) (-0.17)  (0.09) (0.15) (0.99) (0.96) (-0.06) (-0.07) 
opti,t 
0.02 0.02 0.04 0.19*** -0.29 -0.10***  0.01* 0.02 0.05*** 0.21*** -0.44*** -0.20*** 
(0.74) (0.58) (1.06) (4.26) (-5.02) (-2.86)  (1.81) (0.03) (2.54) (6.24) (-4.09) (-3.63) 
stki,t 
-0.03 -0.02 -0.37 -0.47 0.07 0.11  2.95 2.84 1.76 1.78 3.47 3.25 
(-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.16) (-0.21) (0.03) (0.05)  (1.14) (1.10) (0.67) (0.67) (1.37) (1.28) 
REM 
-0.16 -0.19 -0.10 -0.11 -0.18 -0.16  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.01 
(-0.87) (-1.11) (-0.52) (-0.60) (-1.02) (-0.92)  (-0.07) (0.01) (-0.02) (0.07) (-0.30) (0.06) 
REM × opti,t-1 
6.82*** 6.75*** 6.69*** 6.69*** 6.58*** 6.72***  7.29*** 7.31*** 7.05*** 7.13*** 6.97*** 7.22*** 
(23.53) (23.68) (23.10) (23.45) (23.21) (23.79)  (24.20) (23.60) (24.60) (25.17) (23.17) (24.37) 
R2 0.1011 0.1006 0.1042 0.1042 0.1110 0.1007  0.1074 0.1067 0.1111 0.1100 0.1320 0.1099 
F-Stat 129 132 137 136 146 133  120 122 127 125 153 127 
No. of Obs. 12,636 13,018 12,926 12,918 12,843 13,099  10,969 11,288 11,175 11,171 11,074 11,357 
 
